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Parallel Importation of Copyrighted Phonorecords
William C. Tyson*
Robert P. Parker**
International entrepreneurs face obstacles and opportunities
not always shared by their domestic counterparts. Economic trends
such as interest rate differentials and currency fluctuations can pro-
duce tremendous gains or significant losses, and an uncertain legal
environment can have similar consequences. International entrepre-
neurs that trade in copyrighted materials, particularly phonorecords,
confront this latter problem because the current United States copy-
right laws are ambiguous about the propriety of their activity.'
An example of a record's typical international commerce route
illustrates the legal difficulties faced by an international trader. 2 X,
an American manufacturer, acquires the domestic and foreign copy-
rights in a sound recording and licenses Y, a corporation located in
east Asia, to produce and distribute identical records in the eastern
hemisphere. Y sells the records to Z, a record distributor in Y's mar-
keting area. Z sells to T, an American importer who sells the records
in the United States, in direct competition with the American copy-
right owner, X, often at a price considerably lower than that sought
by X.
In the terminology of intellectual property law, T is a parallel
importer, and the records are parallel imports.3 Under the Copy-
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Princeton University;J.D. 1970, Harvard University.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable Oscar H. Davis, United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. B.A. 1981, Johns Hopkins University; J.D. 1984, University of Penn-
sylvania Law School. Mr. Parker co-authored this article prior to beginning his clerkship.
I Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982) (repealing Copyright Act of
1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075). All references to the "Copyright Act" are to the Copy-
right Act of 1976. All references to the "1909 Act" are to the Copyright Act of 1909.
2 In this article the common term "record" will be used instead of the statutory term
"phonorecord." A record is a material object that embodies a sound recording. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101. A sound recording is a work consisting of a series of sounds, musical or spoken,
protected by copyright. Id. Congress first extended copyright protection to sound record-
ings in 1971 to be effective February 15, 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 437 (1971)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The statute is not retroactive. Id.
§ 3. As a result, records produced before the effective date are not protected by copyright.
This policy is continued in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(c).
3 T is also considered a parallel importer if it imports goods purchased from a for-
eign manufacturer-licensor, B, in competition with B's American licensee, A. This is the
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right Act, a parallel importer's status depends primarily on the inter-
pretation of section 106(3) and its interrelationship with other
provisions that incorporate it by reference. Section 106(3) grants
the exclusive right to distribute records to the copyright owner.4
Section 602(a) provides that importation "without the authority of
the owner of the copyright. . . of copies or phonorecords acquired
outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute. . . under Section 106[(3)]." Under this provision, T po-
tentially is a copyright infringer, because T acquired records outside
the United States and imported them apparently without the authori-
zation of X, the copyright owner. Under this interpretation, this ac-
tivity would therefore infringe X's exclusive distribution privilege.
The exclusive distribution privilege, however, is subject to ex-
ceptions and limitations. For instance, section 109(a), which embod-
ies what is commonly called the first sale doctrine, provides a defense
to charges of infringement of a copyright owner's distribution privi-
lege. Section 109(a) states that, section 106(3) notwithstanding, a
person who owns a phonorecord "is entitled, without the authority
of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession
of that. . . phonorecord." Therefore, in a parallel importation situ-
ation, the application of section 109(a) produces a result diametri-
cally opposite from that mandated by the literal terms of section
602(a). In the typical situation, T lawfully possesses the records
purchased from Z, the distributor, and thus may dispose of them in
any way it wishes. Under a plain reading of 109(a), therefore, T is
not an infringer of X's distribution privileges.
When two statutory provisions, such as sections 602(a) and
109(a), clearly conflict, courts attempt to harmonize them by examin-
ing their legislative histories and purposes to determine whether nar-
row interpretations can reconcile them. 5 The procedure is especially
appropriate when the same statute contains the conflicting provi-
sions because presumably Congress did not intend to enact conflict-
ing provisions in a single piece of legislation. 6 If harmonization is
not possible, courts must decide which provision will control.
This article suggests how a court should apply these doctrines to
resolve the apparent conflict between sections 109(a) and 602(a). An
typical pattern of parallel importation in the trademark area. See Takamatsu, Parallel Impor-
tation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 433, 433-34 (1982).
4 Section 106 states, in pertinent part:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do . . . any of the following:
(3) to distribute copies of phonorecords of the copyrighted work by sale or
other transfer of ownership . . ..
17 U.S.C. § 106.
5 S. D'Antoni, Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 496 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1974).
6 Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244 (1972).
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examination of the legislative histories of sections 109(a) and 602(a)
of the Copyright Act is necessary to determine whether a clear pur-
pose for each section emerges. Part I shows that the origins of sec-
tion 109(a) are clear. Part II demonstrates that the legislative history
of section 602(a), however, does not provide an authoritative discus-
sion of its actual purpose.
In Part III the law concerning parallel importation of products
protected by other intellectual property rights-trademarks and pat-
ents-is examined to assist in interpreting section 602(a). In Part IV
the status of parallel importation in other jurisdictions, particularly
other common law jurisdictions and the European Economic Com-
munity, is reviewed. Although the law in these jurisdictions does not
have a direct bearing on the meaning of section 602(a), it provides
valuable insights into judicial methods and general concerns in the
parallel importation area. In Part V three cases that considered par-
allel importation of copyrighted materials are analyzed. Finally, Part
VI concludes that in certain situations sections 109(a) and 602(a) can
be harmonized-in a way that precludes a finding of copyright in-
fringement-without thwarting Congress' intent in enacting section
602(a).
I. The First Sale Doctrine and Section 109(a)
Acquisition of a copyright confers upon its owner five exclusive
privileges: reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribu-
tion, public performance, and public display. 7 The owner of a copy-
right in a sound recording, however, possesses only the first three of
these privileges. 8 The copyright owner may transfer his rights in any
manner except by nonexclusive license and may limit the transfers in
territory or duration.9 In addition, because copyright privileges are
severable, the owner may transfer any one of the underlying privi-
leges while retaining the others. 10 For example, the copyright owner
may sell the right to reproduce a work but not the right to distribute
the copies." 1
The first sale doctrine, which imposes a limit on the distribution
privilege, first arose as a matter of statutory construction rather than
as a statutory enactment. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss12 plaintiff
book publisher charged defendant retailer with copyright infringe-
7 17 U.S.C. § 106(l)-(5).
8 Id. § 114(a).
9 Id. §§ 101, 201(d)(1). Section 201(d)(1) of the Copyright Act allows the owner to
transfer a copyright. Section 101 defines "transfer" as any conveyance "whether or not it
is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license."
10 Id. § 201(d)(2).
II See United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1959), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 23-25.
12 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
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ment after defendant resold copies of the book for less than the price
marked on the book cover. The Supreme Court carefully sought a
result that would neither confer "privileges not intended to be con-
ferred" nor "deprive those entitled to their benefit of the rights Con-
gress intended to grant."' 13 The Court concluded that Congress did
not intend to grant a copyright holder exclusive distribution rights
over resales. 14
Congress codified the Bobbs-Merrill rule in section 27 of the 1909
Act by explicitly distinguishing between the intangible copyright and
the material copies embodying the protected work. Congress sepa-
rated a transfer of the material object from a transfer of the copy-
right and emphasized that "nothing in this title shall be deemed to
forbid, prevent or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted
work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained."' 15 The
legislative history reinforces the broad scope of the statutory terms:
"It would be most unwise to permit the copyright proprietor to exer-
cise any control whatever over the article which is the subject of the
copyright after said proprietor has made the first sale."' 16
Cases arising under the 1909 Act have refined the doctrine of
Bobbs-Merrill and section 27. In Blazon, Inc. v. Deluxe Games Corp. 17 the
district court not only applied the first sale doctrine but also ex-
amined the rule's rationale. The court suggested that the distribu-
tion privilege serves as a complement to the reproduction privilege.
What the copyright owner has sole authority to make, it must have
sole authority to sell; but once the copyright owner makes the first
sale, the distribution privilege no longer is necessary. The policy
against restraint of trade, temporarily submerged by the competing
requirements of the copyright law, resurfaces to restrict the copy-
right owner's control over the subsequent trade in the copies.
A first disposition, therefore, deprives the copyright owner of
any copyright law protection in a case concerning trade in the copy-
righted articles. In Straus & Straus v. American Publishers' Association'8
the Supreme Court concluded, on the authority of Bobbs-Merrill, that
an agreement among publishers to restrain trade in copyrighted
books violated the antitrust laws and treated as if the books had
13 Id. at 346.
14 The Bobbs-Merill Court stated:
To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail
sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a
right not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its
operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with a
view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its enactment.
Id. at 351.
15 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084.
16 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
17 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
18 231 U.S. 222, 236 (1913).
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never been copyrighted. Similarly, in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States' 9 defendants conceded "that the [antitrust] conspiracy charge
is established if the distributors agreed among themselves to impose
the restrictions upon subsequent-run distributors.' '20
Other courts have followed a similar, though not identical, track.
In Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc.2t defendant was the
third party in a chain of purchasers. Plaintiff manufacturer accused
defendant of violating the terms of an agreement that plaintiff had
with the wholesaler regarding distribution of certain records as a
promotional device. The court ruled that defendant could not be
bound by the contract, despite knowledge of the terms of the agree-
ment. The court further held that the first sale doctrine shielded de-
fendant from copyright liability. According to the court, "[t]he
ultimate question under the 'first sale' doctrine is whether or not
there has been such a disposition of the copyrighted article that it
may be fairly said that the copyright proprietor has received its re-
ward for its use." 22 Once the copyright owner reaps a profit from
the disposition of copies of a work, the distribution privilege lapses
as to those copies.
A landmark case on the first sale doctrine is United States v.
Wells, 23 which considered whether a license can constitute a first sale.
In Wells the Government charged Wells with criminal infringement
of a copyright after he had acquired and resold copies of a copy-
righted aerial map. The evidence showed that Wells had procured
the maps from licensees of the copyright owner. Although the licen-
sees had been authorized to produce copies of the map only for their
own use and not for resale, the court acquitted Wells because "there
had been no showing that the copies of the aerial maps were not
published by the lawful licensees of the copyright proprietor or that
title to the copies was retained at all times by the copyright proprie-
tor." 2 4 The court suggested that the appropriate remedy for the
wrong was a breach of contract action by the copyright owner against
the licensees because the copyright statute did not apply.25
In 1976 Congress enacted section 109(a), intending to recodify
the first sale doctrine, "which had been established by the court deci-
19 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
20 Id. at 221.
21 233 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
22 Id. at 884.
23 176 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
24 Id. at 633.
25 The Wells court stated:
It is apparent, therefore, that the protection of the copyright law does not
extend to the transfer of copies published by and belonging to a lawful licen-
see of the copyright proprietor under the license in the present case and that




N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
sions and Section 27 of the present law [the 1909 Act]." 26 The pro-
vision specifically grants to "the owner of a particular ...
phonorecord lawfully acquired under this title" the right to "sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession" of that record without the con-
sent of the copyright owner. Thus, the only limits to the first sale
doctrine within the express terms of the provision are that the per-
son in possession of the record must be an owner, and the record
may not be piratical i.e., that it must have been acquired in a lawful
manner.
II. The Legislative History of Section 602(a)
The Copyright Act contains three prohibitions on importation.
The first prohibition, contained in section 601, prohibits the impor-
tation of the "copies of a work" manufactured abroad, and often is
referred to as the "manufacturing clause." This section has its roots
in a nineteenth century statute that protected the fledgling American
printing trade.27 During subsequent reconsiderations of the manu-
facturing clause, Congress considered legislation similar to the cur-
rent section 602.28 These proposals appeared to have been a
palliative to domestic publishing concerns, and they received no
comment in an authoritative history of the manufacturing clause 29
and never aroused much congressional support.
A second importation prohibition, section 602(b), outlaws the
importation of "piratical" records-records whose manufacture
"would have constituted infringement if this title [the Copyright Act]
had been applicable." The section further provides that the United
States Customs Service may not prevent the importation of lawfully
manufactured records. Thus, the government bars the importation
of piratical, but not parallel, imports.
Section 602(a) is the third importation prohibition. It contains
two ambiguities that confuse the impact of the first sale doctrine.
The section prohibits importation "without the authority of the
owner of copyright under this title." This phrase may mean that
only the express consent of the copyright owner may waive the privi-
lege of freedom from foreign competition guaranteed by the rest of
the section. The section, however, may merely grant to the copy-
right owner the same privileges in international trade that are
granted in the statute. Under this reading, section 602(a) privileges
26 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659.
27 M. MCCANNON, THE MANUFACTURING CLAUSE OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw (1963).
28 H.R. 11476, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1922) ("[Dluring the existence of the Ameri-
can copyright in any book the importation into the United States of any copies thereof
shall be, and is hereby, prohibited, except with the consent of the proprietor of the Ameri-
can copyright."). This proposal is similar to the current § 602(a).
29 M. MCCANNON, supra note 27.
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would be coextensive with domestic copyright privileges (and the
"authority" granted to the copyright owner thereunder), which are
limited to the first disposition of a copy or record.
The second ambiguity in section 602(a) is the assertion that the
importer infringes "the exclusive right to distribute phonorecords
under section 106, actionable under section 501 [civil remedies]."
Under one reading, Congress may have incorporated section 602(a)
into section 106, implying that the copyright owner has complete
control over the distribution of records in the import trade of the
United States. Another interpretation is that the reference to section
106 is a limitation rather than an addition: Congress did not make
parallel importation a separate infringement but conditioned a find-
ing of infringement on the copyright owner's possession of distribu-
tion rights, which are limited by the first sale doctrine.
These ambiguities may be resolved by solving one problem:
does the first sale doctrine apply when the first disposition occurs
abroad? If so, section 109(a) limits the effect of section 602(a). If
the doctrine does not apply, section 602(a) exposes the parallel im-
porter to damages for infringement, apparently without any viable
copyright law defense. The history of section 602(a) provides little
guidance for solving this problem.
In 1955 Congress began the laborious process of copyright revi-
sion, which culminated in the Copyright Act of 1976. As part of this
effort, Congress authorized the Copyright Office of the Library of
Congress to undertake a series of studies on various aspects of copy-
right law that were especially ripe for revision. These efforts pro-
duced the influential Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law (Register's Report).30
The Copyright Office initially counseled against a parallel im-
port provision in any new copyright legislation. The Register's Report
noted that parallel import problems arise when copyright owners li-
cense publication or manufacture of their works abroad and include
in the license agreement a provision dividing the world market be-
tween the foreign and domestic parties. The Register's Report
continued:
We assume, without considering the antitrust questions involved,
that agreements to divide international markets for copyrighted
works are valid and enforceable contracts between the parties. But
we do not believe that the prohibition against imports of piratical
copies should be extended to authorized copies covered by an
agreement of this sort. To do so would impose a territorial restric-
tion in a private contract upon third parties with no knowledge of
the agreement. And even as between the parties, Customs does not
30 STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., RE-
PORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAw (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as REGISTER'S REPORT].
1985] 403
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seem to be an appropriate agency for the enforcement of private
contracts.
3 1
Following release of the Register's Report, the Copyright Office
held meetings with copyright experts to discuss its proposals. The
panel sharply attacked the Copyright Office's recommendations on
parallel imports, supporting its position by positing a case in which
the foreign licensee sells an authorized copy or record within the
designated market, which eventually becomes an American import.
One panelist concluded, "Now it's all right to say, 'Commence a law-
suit for breach of contract.' But this is expensive, burdensome, and,
for the most part, ineffective."' 32 Another panelist was more pessi-
mistic: "There is just no possibility of any contract remedy under
these circumstances, but, as far as I am concerned, it is clearly in-
fringement of the copyright of the United States proprietor. '33
The panel members felt that the importation for sale in the
United States infringes a privilege of the United States licensor, be-
cause the licensor retains exclusive distribution rights in the United
States. 34 This view appears to be the origin of section 602(a)'s men-
tion of the copyright owner's distribution privilege under section
106.
Following these discussions, the Copyright Office acquiesced in
the matter of parallel imports, but did not explain the reasons for its
change. The 1964 Preliminary Draft for Revised United States Copy-
right Law contained two alternative parallel import sections. Each
provided that "[i]mportation into the United States of copies or
records of a work for the purpose of distribution to the public shall,
if such articles are imported without the authority of the owner of the
exclusive right to distribute copies or records under this title, consti-
tute an infringement of copyright actionable under Section 35 [civil
remedies]." '3 5 The sections differed in the duties conferred upon
customs officials, but neither section authorized seizure of parallel
imports.
31 Id. at 126.
32 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 88TH CONG., IST SESS., PART
2: DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN-
ERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 212 (Comm. Print 1963) (statement of Horace
S. Manges, American Book Publishers Council, Inc.).
33 Id. at 213 (statement of Sidney A. Diamond, Landon Records).
34 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON COPYRIGHT REVISION, 88TH CONG., 2d SESS., PART 4:
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW 260 (Comm. Print 1964) (submission of the American Book Publishers Coun-
cil, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. Whether the conclusion follows from the
premise is unclear. The argument assumes that because copyright protection is territori-
ally divisible, privileges in one territory are immune to events elsewhere. As a matter of
copyright theory, the proposition is doubtful.
35 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 88TH CONG., IST SESS., PART
3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS
ON THE DRAFT 32-33 (Comm. Print 1964).
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The question of applying the first sale doctrine to the parallel
import provision again arose in the discussions concerning the 1964
draft. A proposed hypothetical concerned a German licensee who
sells copies or records to a German jobber who seeks to export the
purchase to the United States. Mr. Goldman of the Copyright Office
responded:
I would suppose that the whole answer depends on whether the dis-
tribution that would take place in the United States would itself con-
stitute an infringement of copyright. When you apply this rule
about the effect of the first sale of a copy exhausting the right to
control the further distribution of that copy, your question would be
whether this represents a sale of a copy that does exhaust the right.
This could vary from one situation to another, I guess. I should
guess, for example, that if a book publisher transports copies to a
wholesaler, this is not yet the kind of transaction that exhausts the
right to control disposition.3 6
Mr. Goldman did not indicate why this transaction would not ex-
haust the distribution privilege. His comment strongly suggests,
however, that some type of transaction abroad will satisfy the first
sale doctrine, contrary to the suggestion of the panelists that territo-
rial distribution privileges are completely separate.
In its 1965 Supplementary Report the Copyright Office officially
recommended that Congress enact a parallel importation prohibi-
tion. 37 The Supplementay Report suggested that the prohibition pro-
vide that, even if the copies or phonorecords were made lawfully,
their distribution in the United States would violate the exclusive
rights of the United States copyright owner.38 The Office noted that,
under the proposed provisi 6 n, importation from a foreign manufac-
turer licensed to distribute only in a particular market would violate
the prohibition.3 9
36 STAFF REPORT, supra note 34, at 211 (statement of A. A. Goldman, Copyright Of-
fice). It is important to remember that these discussions were informal and spontaneous.
Even so, the evolution of Mr. Goldman's position with respect to the first sale doctrine and
parallel imports shows the difficulty and uncertainty that confronted the drafters of the
preliminary version of the statute. Mr. Goldman first stated that the parallel import provi-
sion, § 44(a), prevents all parallel imports. He then stated that § 44(a) might not apply
depending on the circumstances of the disposition and concluded by asking the partici-
pants whether they considered the first sale doctrine to be an argument against inclusion
of a parallel import provision. The conversation then became sidetracked. Id. at 210-11.
37 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON COPYRIGHT REVISION, 89TH CONG., IST SESS., PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw: 1965 REVISION BILL 148-50 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter
cited as SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT].
38 Id. at 292.
39 The Copyright Office concluded that "the sale of authorized copies beyond a territo-
rial limitation" should not be an infringement. REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 30, at 126
(emphasis added). The Copyright Office also suggested that distribution authorized in a
particular country does not prevent "unauthorized importation" from being an infringement
under the 1965 statute. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 148-49 (emphasis ad-
ded). The Copyright Office concluded, therefore, that the word "authority" in § 602(a)
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The Supplementary Report ended the thorough consideration of
the parallel import provision. Congress enacted the parallel impor-
tation provision proposed by the Copyright Office without ex-
panding on the language of the statute in its reports. The legislative
history of section 602(a) is, therefore, of uncertain value, because an
unofficial panel provides most of the debate. Even the conclusions
of the Copyright Office provide little insight, given Mr. Goldman's
reluctance to express a firm opinion about the effect of a first foreign
sale on subsequent parallel imports. 40
The panel discussions, however, provide insight into the prob-
lem that section 602(a) is designed to confront. The Copyright Of-
fice placed a parallel import provision in the 1964 draft to alleviate
the fear of the panelists that foreign licensees could breach with im-
punity the territorial restrictions in their agreements with American
copyright owners. In this respect, section 602(a) is a copyright-law
substitute for a breach of contract action. A United States copyright
holder must show that the foreign manufacturer breached the license
agreement to benefit from section 602(a). Otherwise, the manufac-
turer and subsequent purchasers act with the authority of the copy-
right owner, whose exclusive distribution privilege does not prohibit
their activity.
Ill. Parallel Imports Under Trademark and Patent Law
Because the history of section 602(a) does not disclose an une-
quivocal congressional purpose, guidance from analogous legal ar-
eas is crucial to interpret the section. In this Part, judicial treatment
of the equivalents of section 602(a) in United States trademark and
patent law is considered.
A. Trademarks
Examination of trademark law provides guidance in interpreting
section 602(a). Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 193041 prohibits the
hinges on the limited distribution privilege and is not an absolute right to ban imports.
The Office also offered no official opinion as to whether the authorized foreign distribu-
tion implies a consent on the part of the copyright owner to importation.
40 Another clue as to the effect of the first sale doctrine on § 602(a) arose during the
final panel discussions. One panelist raised the question whether a compulsory license
provision applies abroad. A compulsory license provision allows an artist to use a copy-
righted musical work upon the payment of a royalty. A common example is the use of the
song "Happy Birthday to You" on television or in films. The compulsory license rule is,
therefore, a limitation on the copyright owner's privileges. Mr. Goldman opined that a
foreign manufacturer may reap the benefits of this rule: "If there is no exclusive owner of
the right to distribute in the United States, and there is no such right being violated, I
guess [the parallel importation provision] has no application." SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT,
supra note 37 (statement of A. A. Goldman, Copyright Office). This provides further, al-
beit secondary, evidence that the limitations on § 106(3) apply to limit the scope of
§ 602(a).
41 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
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importation of goods manufactured abroad that bear the registered
trademark of a United States citizen. Section 42 of the Lanham
Act, 4 2 a similar provision, prohibits the importation of goods bearing
trademarks that "copy or simulate" registered trademarks. Thus,
section 526 is the parallel importation prohibition and has been the
subject of parallel importation litigation.
The similarity between sections 526 and 602(a) provides fertile
ground for comparison. Examination of section 526 litigation, which
is more prevalent than litigation under section 602(a) because of the
forty-six-year difference in their ages, reveals the complexities of par-
allel importation. Indeed, the litigants in a recent parallel importa-
tion case relied heavily on an analogy between the two provisions.43
A perplexing question that has arisen under section 526 is
whether the provision bars importation of genuine articles, such as
articles bearing a genuine trademark lawfully attached by the manu-
facturer-a "nonpiratical trademark." In cases involving section
526, the foreign manufacturer's American licensee generally objects
to the imports. A line of cases prior to the enactment of sections 526
and 42 held that American trademark proprietors could not bar im-
portation of genuine goods.44 Passage of the predecessor to section
42 did not change this result because trademarks affixed to genuine
goods do not "copy or simulate" the American mark.45
Congress passed section 526 in response to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals opinion in A. Bourois & Co. v. Katzel.46 In Katzel the
assignee of the right to use a French firm's trademark in the United
States sued a parallel importer of goods manufactured by the French
firm and bearing its trademark. In line with prior holdings, the court
ruled for defendant, because the goods were the genuine product of
the French trademark owner.
Although Congress passed section 526 while Katzel was pending
in the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes did not mention the section in
his opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court ruled that defendant
had infringed plaintiffs mark because, by public understanding, the
trademark indicated that the goods originated from plaintiff and not
defendant. 47 Katzel, therefore, involved classic infringement and not
42 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
43 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Its Motion of Summary Judgment and in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively for SummaryJudgment at 5,
CBS v. Scorpio Music Distributors, 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aftd without published
opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984) (plaintiff analogizes §§ 526 and 602(a) and relies upon
Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
vacated on procedural grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983)). See also infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1916).
45 Id. at 782.
46 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
47 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692.
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parallel importation. Although the opinion did not mention the
predecessors of sections 526 and 42, the case falls within the scope
of section 42, which covers the importation of infringing trademarks,
rather than within the parallel importation restrictions. 48
Because the Supreme Court declined to apply section 526 in
Katzel, the section's precise scope remained unclear. Commentators
and courts alike have found significant Congress' specific reaction to
the court of appeals opinion in Katzel, which held that importation of
genuine merchandise could never infringe a trademark.49 In this
light, "the purpose of the section was to protect American purchas-
ers of foreign owned trademarks from fraud and breaches of contract
by the vendors of such marks." 50 This protection apparently was the
sole purpose of section 526.51
Commentators on section 526, like the Copyright Office panel-
ists, have noted that breach of contract actions against foreigners in-
herently are difficult, and sometimes impossible, if the manufacturer
deals exclusively with foreign parties who may be unaware of the
American license. 52 Thus, sections 526 and 602(a) have remarkably
similar histories.
Courts, too, have considered the scope of section 526. The
court in United States v. Guerlain, Inc.53 narrowly construed section
526, limiting it to its historic purpose "despite the absence of specific
language to that effect in the legislation. ' 54 The Government
charged that defendants had misused section 526 and thereby vio-
lated the antitrust laws by blocking importation of merchandise pro-
duced by manufacturers abroad who had close economic ties to
defendants. "In view of the litigated history of the issue involved
and of the legislative history of the section,"' 55 including Congress'
passage of section 526 solely to protect the rights of American trade-
mark licensees, the court ruled for the Government. Since the party
invoking section 526 needed no contract remedy substitute (because
48 Vandenburgh, The Problem of Parallel Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods Is Not a
Trademark Problem, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 707, 710-11 (1959).
49 See, e.g., Note, Trade-mark Infringement: The Power of an American Trade-mark Owner To
Prevent the Importation of the Authentic Product Manufactured by a Foreign Company, 64 YALE L. J.
557, 566 (1955); United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. 77, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated,
358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (United States requested
vacatur prior to consideration by the Supreme Court.).
50 Note, supra note 49, at 566; see also Comment, Preventing the Importation and Sale of
Genuine Goods Bearing American-Owned Trademarks: Protecting an American Goodwill, 35 ME. L.
REV. 315, 319 (1983).
51 62 Cong. Rec. 11,603 (1922) (remarks of Sen. Sutherland).
52 Note, Importation Control Under Tariff Act § 526: Trademark Privileges and Antitrust Pol-
icy, 67 YALE L. REv. 1110, 1111 n.2 (1958).
53 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F.
Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).




the two parties to the contract had close economic ties), the court
ruled that the antitrust laws prevented use of the prohibition.
The court in Bell & Howell. Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. 5 6 se-
verely criticized the Guerlain opinion. The Mamiya court relied
squarely on the words of section 526 and argued that Congress in-
tended to overrule the entire line of cases leading up to Katzel. The
Mamiya court also believed that Katzel controlled Guerlain, because
the Guerlain defendants had built substantial goodwill under their
trademark in the United States. This argument, however, addresses
the question of trademark infringement and not parallel importation.
Recently, a court distinguished Mamiya from Guerlain and ap-
plied the rationale of the latter.57 Guerlain's authority is unclear,
however, because it was vacated. Moreover, the court admittedly ig-
nored the language of the statute in an attempt to effectuate congres-
sional intent. The Mamiya court, however, misconstrued the
legislative history when it suggested that Congress was concerned
with anything but the immediate situation in Katzel. Congress passed
section 526 at the final hour after limited debate, and other courts
whose decisions were controlling in the Mamiya case have stated that
"if the reversal of the [appellate court's] decision by the Supreme
Court in [Katzel] had occurred prior to the date of the Tariff Act the
provisions in question would not have been enacted at all." 58
The histories and purposes of sections 526 and 602(a) are simi-
lar. Congress intended each section as a remedy for an otherwise
irremediable breach of contract by a foreign producer that is suffered
by a domestic intellectual property holder. Guerlain demonstrates
that courts will interpret parallel importation provisions consistent
with their purposes and will not extend the remedy to situations that
arise outside the scope of the provisions. As an antitrust prosecu-
tion, Guerlain emphatically illustrates that parallel importation provi-
sions are not a means by which domestic concerns can exert greater
control over international competition than their property rights
allow.
The relationship between the foreign and domestic manufactur-
ers determines the antitrust consequences of reliance upon section
526. Similarly, the first sale doctrine in copyright law is the boundary
between monopolistic conduct protected by copyright and impermis-
sible restraint of trade. 59 Like section 526, section 602(a) is
56 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated on procedural grounds, 719 F.2d 42 (2d
Cir. 1983).
57 Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416, 419-20 (S.D.
Fla. 1983).
58 Sturges v. Clarkes D. Peasae, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1039 (2d Cir. 1931). See also Coty,
Inc. v. LeBlume Import Co., 292 F. 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
59 Note, Copyright Reform and the Author's Right To "'end": The Case of the Unpaid Manu-
facturer, 10 IND. L. REV. 507, 514 (1977).
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designed to protect against irremediable breaches of contract. Once
the copyright owner has "received its reward for its use,"' 60 by first
sale or license, section 602(a)'s remedy is no longer necessary.
B. Patents
Patent law, like trademark law, provides some guidance in inter-
preting section 602(a). Before Congress had codified a prohibition
against parallel importation of a product covered by an American
patent, the Supreme Court had developed such a rule in Boesch v.
Graft,6 1 an infringement suit. Plaintiffs owned the American and
German patents in certain types of laboratory burners. Defendants
purchased the burners from a German producer who was entitled to
sell them under German patent law. The Court concluded that "pur-
chasers from the German source could not [by virtue of the purchase
from him] be thereby authorized to sell articles in the United States
in defiance of the rights of the patentees under a United States pat-
ent."'62 This fact pattern rarely arises in modern litigation. 63
The prohibition against parallel imports arises more commonly
in proceedings under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,64 which
grants the International Trade Commission the authority to ban im-
portation of infringing goods. 65 Those harmed by the parallel im-
ports acquired a convenient remedy. A proceeding before the
International Trade Commission is in rem rather than in personam
because "an exclusion order operates against goods, not parties,"
and therefore, provides "an adequate remedy for domestic indus-
tries against unfair methods of competition. ' 66
Section 337 has a different history from section 526 but is simi-
lar in effect. Congress sought to alleviate the problems faced by
American purchasers of foreign trademarks by enacting section 526.
Similarly, section 337 protects American patentees from unfair use
of their patented process or manufacture of their patented product
abroad. Because the only reachable parties are American importers
and their customers, "[t]he owner of a patent, seeking to protect
himself [was] confronted with the necessity of proceeding against in-
dividual wholesalers or retailers. The resulting multiplicity of suits
imposes an impossible burden," and the "stoppage of importation of
infringing articles is the only effective remedy."' 67 Thus, both sec-
60 Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir. 1963).
61 133 U.S. 697 (1890).
62 Id. at 703.
63 But see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Byron Chem. Co., 223 F. Supp. 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
64 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
65 See In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
66 Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 985
(C.C.P.A. 1981).
67 In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d at 467 (quoting U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, 17 SUPP. TO TARIFF
READJUSTMENT REPORTS ON TARIFF BILL OF 1929, at 10,667).
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tions 337 and 526 are intellectual property devices intended to pro-
tect against underlying unfair practices abroad. As in the trademark
area, the remaining question about these sections is what constitutes
an unfair practice by the foreign user of the patent.
Patent law mirrors copyright law in many respects, including the
scope of the first sale doctrine. The Supreme Court has ruled that,
at least within the United States, the purchaser of a patented article
from a licensee within an assigned territory may resell the article
outside that area. In Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co.68 the Court
ruled that in patent law, as well as in copyright law, "one who buys
patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to sell them
becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, un-
restricted in time or place." 69
In this respect, Keeler conflicts with Boesch, in which defendants
who purchased the burners from the German manufacturer had in-
fringed upon plaintiffs American patent. Thus, the first sale doc-
trine collides with parallel importation restrictions in patents as well
as in copyrights. The Keeler Court distinguished Boesch, however, by
noting that in Boesch, "neither the patentee or [sic] any assignee had
ever received any royalties or given any license to use the patented article in
any part of the United States." 70
On its face this conclusion suggests that patents are completely
and exclusively territorial. The implicit rationale is that a patentee
who licenses foreign production relinquishes privileges only in the
country of manufacture, and the patentee's privileges in the United
States remain intact. 7' The facts of Boesch, however, do not support
this broad reading. The German manufacturer in Boesch produced
the burners under the patent law doctine of prior user. He asserted
his privilege to produce and sell burners by operation of German law
and not from rights granted by the patentee. 72 The Boesch Court
ruled that these German patent principles could not bind an Ameri-
can court. The German patent doctrine, therefore, did not give the
American importer the right to market the product in the United
States.73 The Keeler Court then confirmed that, under American law,
68 157 U.S. 659 (1895).
69 Id. at 666.
70 Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
71 Ladas, Exclusive Territorial Licenses Under Parallel Patents, 3 INT'L REv. OF INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 335, 339 (1972).
72 133 U.S. at 701-02.
73 The Boesch Court stated:
The right which Hecht had to make and sell the burners in Germany was
allowed him under the laws of that country, and purchasers from him could
not be thereby authorized to sell the articles in the United States . . . . The
sale of articles in the United States under a United States patent cannot be
controlled by foreign laws.
Id. at 703.
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a purchase from the patentee's licensee deprives the patentee and
licensee of any control over the merchandise.
At least one recent case indicates that American patentees may
not claim United States patent protection if their conduct abroad ex-
ceeds the scope of their privileges. In United States v. National Lead
Co.74 defendant chemical companies divided the world market in tita-
nium by a series of interlocking licenses granted under patents is-
sued all over the world. The court held that this plan violated the
antitrust laws because the privileges acquired by the patentees under
the licenses exceeded their entitlement. 75 The court found that de-
fendants "regulated the disposition of the products by the licen-
sees," although the patents had been conferred by other countries.
Essentially, the court held that a "first sale" anywhere in the world
results in a complete loss of patent privileges under United States
law.
The National Lead court did not suggest that the territorial
licenses violate the antitrust laws. The court stated that an American
patentee has no greater right to control international trade in his
product than in the domestic market. Thus, National Lead implies
that intellectual property owners who license the manufacture and
distribution abroad of protected articles may not prohibit importa-
tion of the product.76
IV. Cases from Other Jurisdictions
Although the statutes of many nations prohibit in some manner
the importation of copyrighted materials, 77 comparing American and
foreign treatment of parallel importation is difficult. Foreign copy-
right statutes differ from each other and from the American copy-
right statute. In addition, most foreign copyright statutes prohibit
only piratical imports. Foreign decisions interpreting the local copy-
right statute offer some guidance, however, on how courts should
construe section 602(a) and provide insights on the parallel importa-
tion problem in general.
74 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), afJJd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
75 Thus, the court effectively held that the licensing agreements under foreign pat-
ents violated American antitrust laws because the privileges acquired via the licensing
agreements exceeded the scope of any patent. "The system of territorial allocation . . .
cannot be justified as ancillary to the grant of a license under a patent . . . . [The agree-
ments] applied to commerce beyond the scope of any patents." National Lead, 63 F. Supp.
at 523-24.
76 Id. at 524. The court cited two patent cases, United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316
U.S. 241 (1942), and United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944),
that applied the first sale doctrine in a domestic context. National Lead, however, involved
international trade, thereby indicating that, in patent law at least, the first sale doctrine
attaches to dispositions abroad as well as in the United States.
77 For a recent survey of statutes on parallel imports in European countries, see
Riemer, Copyright Law and the Free Movement of Goods, 12 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & CoPY-




In common-law jurisdictions, the starting point for an overview
of parallel importation cases is Interstate Parcel Express Co. v. Time-Life
International,78 decided by Australia's High Court. Time, Inc., an
American corporation, licensed Time-Life International to distribute
Time, Inc.'s publications outside the United States. Interstate Parcel
purchased copies of Time, Inc.'s book series, "Foods of the World,"
from a California distributor and imported them into Australia.
Time-Life sued for infringement under an Australian statute that
provides that "the copyright in a . . .work is infringed by a person
who, without the license of the owner of copyright, imports an article
into Australia" for the purpose of resale, where "the making of the
article would, if the article had been made in Australia by the im-
porter, have constituted an infringement of the copyright."'79
In a highly criticized opinion, 80 the High Court ruled for plain-
tiff. The court held that under this statutory scheme, the only ques-
tion was whether defendant possessed an implied license to import
the copies into Australia by virtue of Time, Inc.'s sale in the United
States. Defendant relied on British patent cases, which held that a
patentee grants an implied license to a purchaser to use or dispose of
a patented article at will. The court rejected this analogy. In the
court's view, because Australian patent law grants the patentees the
right to control use of the product in the hands of the purchaser, an
implied license is an economic necessity. Conversely, because a
copyright owner has no power to control the purchaser's use of a
lawfully obtained copy, implied license in the copyright area is
unnecessary. 8 '
Canadian courts likewise have prohibited the parallel importa-
tion of copyrighted materials. In Clarke, Irwin & Co. v. C. Cole & Co. 8 2
the High Court of Ontario ruled that defendant had violated the Ca-
nadian copyright statute when it imported copies of a book from the
American licensee of the Canadian copyright owner. In its opinion,
the court compared two situations. In the first situation, a Canadian
agent (or licensee) of the copyright owner sought to prevent impor-
tation of the copyrighted materials by the copyright owner. The
court stated that the licensee could not prevent this importation
78 138 C.L.R. 534 (Austl. 1977).
79 Copyright Act, AUSTL. C. AcTs, No. 63, § 37 (1968).
80 See Cornish & McGonigal, Copyright and Antitrust Aspects of Imports Under Australian
Law, II INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 731, 742-43 (1980).
81 138 C.L.R. at 542-44.
82 22 D.L.R.2d 183 (Can. 1960). See also Godfrey, MacSkimming & Bacque, Ltd. v.
Coles Book Stores Ltd., 40 D.L.R.3d 346 (Can. 1973) (reaffirmance of Clarke, Irwin). The
Copyright Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 55, § 17(4) (1952), states: "Copyright in a work shall
also be deemed to be infringed by any person who .. .(d) imports for sale or hire into
Canada any work that to his knowledge infringes copyright or would infringe copyright if it
had been made within Canada."
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under this circumstance, because the copies were produced by the
copyright owner who would not infringe the copyright as long as it
manufactured the articles in Canada.
In the second situation, the case under consideration, the court
stated, on the other hand, that the Canadian copyright owner could
prevent importation from a foreign licensee because the licensee
could not produce the merchandise in Canada without infringing the
Canadian copyright.8 3
The British courts also have considered a variety of fact pat-
terns. In CBS Ltd. v. Charmdale Record Distributors, Ltd.8 4 the court
considered a case similar to Time-Life but reached a different result
under the Canadian/British statutory framework. The court found
that CBS Ltd. could not enjoin the importation of records made by
the American licensor-copyright owner, because production of
records in Great Britain by the copyright owner could not constitute
infringement. The court suggested that such a practice might consti-
tute a breach of contract but not a copyright violation.
In Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Ltd.8 5 the British court enjoined im-
portation of records into England produced by a Portuguese licen-
see, at the insistence of the British licensee of the copyright owner.
The court noted that "the making of the Portuguese records could
have constituted an infringement if the records had been made in the
United Kingdom without the license of the plaintiffs who hold the
license as far as the United Kingdom is concerned."'8 6
These cases arose under piratical and not parallel importation
statutes. The primary purpose of piratical statutes is to restrict im-
portation of articles that were made unlawfully. Clearly aberrational,
the Australian statute tests whether the importer could have manu-
factured the product in Australia without infringing the copyright.
Under this scheme, the only party effectively immune from suit by
the Australian licensee is the foreign copyright owner who, by im-
porting into Australia, probably would breach the license agreement.
Therefore, all parallel imports are effectively prohibited in Australia.
In Great Britain and Canada the test is whether the manufac-
turer abroad could have manufactured the goods in Great Britain
without infringing the British copyright. Therefore, articles pro-
duced by the copyright owner may enter these countries, but those
manufactured by other licensees may not. Charmdale suggests that if
the copyright owner actually produced the records in Britain, a suit
for breach of contract might lie. The court did not consider whether
83 22 D.L.R. at 188-89. See also Noel, The Importation Provisions of the Canadian Copyright
Act, 9 OrAWA L. REV. 156 (1977).
84 [19801 2 All E.R. 807 (Ch. D.). The English statute, Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5
Eliz. 2, ch. 74, § 16(2), is similar to the Canadian statute.
85 28 Common Mkt. L.R. 413 (1980).
86 Id. at 415.
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distribution abroad by the copyright owner of products that subse-
quently entered Britain would also constitute a breach of contract.
The court's silence implies that importation in this situation would
not constitute a breach.
The language of section 602 does not correspond with these
rules. Section 602(b), concerning piratical importation, addresses a
different situation from the Australian or British laws. The section
assumes that the manufacturer produced the records in a context in
which American law applies. Section 602(a) has no counterpart
abroad because it bases a finding of infringement on the domestic
copyright owner's right of distribution. The question remains
whether that privilege is exhausted by a first sale abroad.
The only court to consider that question is the Australian High
Court in Time-Life. The Time-Life court, however, reached its result
only because it refused to analogize between patent and copyright
law, given inherent differences in the powers conferred by each. In
the United States the similarity between patents and copyrights is
much greater,8 7 and the first sale doctrine in each area is identical.
Thus, the foundation for the Time-Life court's ruling is not easily
translated to the American scheme.
B. The European Economic Community (EEC)
One of the fundamental tenets of the European Economic Com-
munitys8 is unrestricted trade between member nations. 89 Because
restrictions on parallel imports tend to fetter international trade, the
EEC's Court of Justice has considered a number of parallel import
problems. Its opinions are rich with material on the effects of na-
tional intellectual property rights on international commerce.
Two EEC Court of Justice cases are especially noteworthy be-
cause, viewed globally, they create a useful and detailed theory of
parallel importation protection. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel90 arose
from a patent infringement proceeding instituted in Holland by an
American pharmaceutical company on behalf of its Dutch licensees.
Parke, Davis sought to enjoin importation of pharmaceuticals into
87 See supra text accompanying notes 59-69.
88 The highest judicial authority within the EEC is the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Community. Before the court issues a judgment, one of its members, the Advocate
General, delivers an opinion explaining pertinent precedents and principles. The court
then issues a sparse, conclusory judgment, almost always adopting the Advocate General's
conclusions. See Herzog, The Procedure Before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 41
WASH. L. REV. 438, 481 (1966). The discussion by the Advocate General is therefore
much more illuminating than the actual judgment of the court.
89 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts.
85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. 2, 47-49. Article 85 prohibits anticompetitive combinations; article
86 prohibits any use of a dominant market position.
90 7 Common Mkt. L.R. 47 (1968).
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Holland from Italy, which denies patent protection to drugs or to the
processes by which they are made.
The court ruled that Holland may, consistent with EEC princi-
ples, forbid the importation of drugs from Italy. Limiting the opin-
ion to this question, 9' the Advocate General noted that the Italian
imports could render Parke, Davis' Dutch patents useless: "Indeed,
there would not remain much of the legal monopoly of exploitation
which is to guarantee to the inventor a chance of fair remuneration,
for the non-patent-holders could without difficulty supply the whole
Common Market from a country in which no patent existed .... .92
The Court ofJustice reached a different result when faced with a
pure parallel imports problem in Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft
GmbH. v. Metro-sB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. 93 Deutsche Grammophon
(DG) owned 99.5 percent of a French subsidiary, Polydor S.A. Paris.
Polydor had the authority to manufacture and distribute records in
which DG had the copyright. Polydor, however, resold records man-
ufactured by DG in Germany to a Swiss wholesaler that sold the
records to a German retailer. The German retailer then offered the
records at a price substantially lower than DG requested.
The German court ruled for DG,94 holding that the transfer
from DG to Polydor was not an exhaustion of DG's distribution right
because the two companies were related economically. It further
ruled that according to the principles of territoriality, the foreign sale
did not exhaust DG's distribution privilege in Germany. It stated
that copyright "is the outcome of the idea of granting the creator of a
work exclusive rights for a certain country." 95
While the decision of the German court was under review by the
Court of Justice, the Advocate General, urging reversal, opined that
the territoriality principle applies only to a nation's independent
conferral of copyright privileges, and thus, nations that give domes-
tic legal effect to events occurring abroad do not abridge the doc-
trine. The Advocate General concluded that any other reading of
the territoriality principle would be too broad, because it would
grant the intellectual property owner greater protection than neces-
sary, at the expense of unrestricted trade.96 Therefore, any prohibi-
91 Intervenors suggested the possibility that the drugs had been manufactured under
a Parke, Davis patent in a third country, shipped to Italy, and then transported to Holland.
The Advocate General refused to consider this remote possibility, and it did not appear in
the judgment of the court. Id. at 51.
92 Id. at 53.
93 10 Common Mkt. L.R. 631 (1971).
94 The Judgment of the Hanseatische Oberlandesgericht is reprinted in English in id.
at 636-44.
95 Id. at 643. The court concluded that "distribution rights [in the domestic market]
cannot be extinguished therefore by a previous foreign marketing." Id. The court noted,
however, a divergence of scholarly opinion on this matter. Id. at n.10.
96 The Advocate General concluded:
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tion against parallel imports in Deutsche Grammophon could violate the
competition rules of the Community.
Although it is difficult to use foreign cases as a model for con-
struing American statutes, the EEC cases are consistent with the
American scheme. First, the EEC views its exhaustion doctrine as a
necessary limitation on copyright privileges, as do the American
courts, which have developed a similar first sale doctrine. Second,
both the EEC and the American courts view the first sale doctrine as
a border between the monopolistic copyright privileges necessary to
reward authors for their works and the fundamental policy of ume-
strained trade among the states within their respective jurisdic-
tions. 97 Once the author reaps the reward, regardless of where it
occurs, the monopoly of the copyright statute lapses.
The European cases also comport with a fair reading of section
602(a). If the copyright owner authorizes distribution when it
licenses abroad, it cannot complain when the stream of commerce
flows back in the domestic market.98 Any import prohibition would
hamper free trade. The copyright owner has no legitimate com-
plaint, since it receives its reward from the licensee, and thereby ex-
hausts its monopolistic distribution privilege.9 9 Any further
prohibition on imports is unnecessary to protect the copyright.
V. Cases on Parallel Imports of Copyrighted Materials
An examination of the three United States cases dealing with the
parallel importation of copyrighted materials also provides guidance
as to the proper interpretation of section 602(a). Prior to the pas-
sage of the Copyright Act, the only case to raise the issue of the pro-
priety of parallel importation of copyrighted materials was United
States v. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. 100 In Addison-Wesley a consent
decree halted a government antitrust prosecution against publishers
who had arranged with their British counterparts for exclusive copy-
right licenses in the United States. An antitrust problem arose when
the publishers collectively restricted American firms from parallel
importing British publications for which the Americans had licenses.
In view of this situation there is in fact much to be said for the view that since
the bounds of the territoriality principle are so uncertain it does not form
part of the substance of the protection. In any event this applies to the par-
ticular problem of the present proceedings, i.e., a situation in which, as the
Oberlandesgericht has held, a legal person connected with the holder of the
rights has marketed the goods in question abroad. Here it should be decisive that
the purpose of the industrial protection rights was ufilled when the goods were first mar-
keted, since it was possible to use the monopolistic opportunity for gain.
Id. at 648-49 (emphasis added). Had Polydor not been a subsidiary of DG, the sale from
DG to Polydor would have led to a different result in the German courts. Id. at 642.
97 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12 (1982).
98 This is the lesson of National Lead, discussed supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
9 See United States v. Wells, discussed supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
100 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,225 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1976).
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The decree is without precedential value but provides an excel-
lent view of parallel imports before the enactment of the Copyright
Act. It illustrates, however, how the parties involved perceived the
law prior to the Copyright Act. The publishing companies agreed
not to restrict "any purchaser of a lawfully published Book from im-
porting or exporting such Book to or from the United States."' 0 1
Moreover, the decree stated that the publishers could exercise their
copyrights to the full extent of the law, "provided that no foreign
copyright law or other foreign statutory right may be used by any
defendant to exclude or restrict the importation or resale in the
United States of a lawfully published Book."' 0 2 The law prior to the
Copyright Act, therefore, was much like patent law, because the Addi-
son- Wesley result mirrors National Lead.
CBS v. Scorpio Music Distributors,10 3 which arose after Congress
passed the Copyright Act, essentially is a classic parallel importation
case. Plaintiff CBS owned the copyrights on the records involved.
CBS-Sony, Inc., a Japanese corporation, had the authority to license
the manufacture of CBS records in the Philippines. Vicor Music Cor-
poration, the Philippine licensee, sold the records to Rainbow Music,
Inc., a Philippine record distibutor. International Traders, Inc., a
United States importer, purchased the records from Rainbow Music
and sold them to Scorpio Music Distributors in the United States
pursuant to a prior agreement. The court held that Scorpio was a
contributory infringer along with International Traders. Therefore,
Scorpio was held severally liable for all of the allegedly infringing
events, including the importation of the records. Thus, a dispute ex-
isted between the copyright owner and the parallel importer.
Scorpio conceded that the records came from outside the
United States and without the express authorizaton of CBS, thus sat-
isfying the two predicates for infringement liability under section
602(a). Scorpio's principal argument was that section 602(a) must
be read narrowly in light of section 109(a).
The Scorpio court rejected this argument and, satisfied that sec-
tion 602(a) applied, hinged its result on a narrow reading of the first
sale doctrine. The court supported this conclusion on two grounds.
The court focused on the section 109(a) requirement that the copies
protected by the first sale doctrine must be "lawfully made under this
title," which, according to the court, means made in the United
States. The court reasoned, in the alternative, that if Scorpio pre-
vailed, importers could bypass section 602(a) merely by purchasing
101 Id. at 70,642.
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records indirectly. Neither of these contentions stands up under se-
rious scrutiny.
In support of its first rationale that "lawfully made under this
title" means made in the United States, the Scorpio court asserted that
"the protection afforded by the United States Code does not extend
beyond the borders of this country unless the Code expressly
states."' 10 4 This assertion clearly is incorrect. Courts have held that
a vast number of statutes that do not specifically so provide, apply to
conduct abroad. 10 5 For example, in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,106 an
intellectual property case, Bulova sought to enjoin Steele's use of the
"Bulova" trademark on watches manufactured in Mexico. The Steele
Court announced a rule that conflicts with the rule relied upon in
Scorpio, holding that United States law governed Steele's conduct
even though Congress did not expressly give the trademark statute
extraterritorial application.10
7
The court in Scorpio erred in focusing on the words in section
109(a), "under this title," rather than on the entire phrase, "lawfully
made under this title."' 08 By implication, Congress intended to ex-
clude records "unlawfully" made under the copyright laws from the
purview of section 109(a). Thus, the owner of records produced
without the copyright owner's consent may not dispose of them free
of copyright liability. In international trade, the infringing records
are piratical and, under section 602(b), may not be imported. Thus,
notwithstanding section 602(a), importers may not claim the protec-
tion of the first sale doctrine if the records were manufactured by a
foreign infringer, no matter how many intermediaries stand between
the infringer and the importer. This construction gives meaning to
the entire statutory phrase rather than to a few words and is consis-
tent with the language of section 109(a).
Moreover, CBS' view on the scope of the copyright title is erro-
neous. To support its argument that the first sale doctrine is limited
to domestic sales, CBS pointed to the section of the House Report
accompanying the Copyright Act, which states that the revisions in
the duration of copyright protection were designed to place United
States law in line with that of other countries.' 0 9 Reliance on this
104 The court concluded that "the section grants first sale protection to the third party
buyer of copies which have been legally manufactured and sold within the United States
and not to purchasers of imports such as are involved here." Id. at 49.
105 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443-44
(2d Cir. 1945) (agreements signed outside the United States to divide world markets ex-
cluding the United States still violate American antitrust laws).
106 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
107 Id. at 286-87. The Court stated, "We do not deem material that petitioner affixed
the mark 'Bulova' in Mexico City rather than here." Id. at 287. By analogy, a first sale, if
deemed significant by United States law, will have the effect given it by such law whether
or not it occurs within the United States.
108 569 F. Supp. at 49.
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section confuses territorial legislative jurisdiction, which was the
concern in Steele, with the territorial principle of copyrights. The lat-
ter holds that each state grants separate copyright protection within
its borders. The territoriality principle does not necessarily mean,
however, that events abroad have no impact on domestic copyright
infringement liability.
The court's alternative rationale for its holding- that reading
the first sale doctrine into section 602(a) "would render section
602(a) virtually meaningless"-is conclusory."10 The court feared
that importers could "circumvent the statute, in every instance, by
simply buying the records indirectly.""'I l Yet, domestic consumers
similarly circumvent a copyright owner's distribution privilege every
time they purchase from a retailer rather than a publisher.
The purpose of the first sale doctrine is to limit the copyright
holder's ability to control the stream of commerce in the work. The
argument that the application of the rule would impose this limit-
that the rule therefore should not apply-circumvents the purpose of
the doctrine.112 The court concluded that a ruling for Scorpio
"would undermine the purpose of the statute."' 13 The court never
considered the purpose of section 602(a) and therefore left un-
resolved the issue raised by Scorpio's principal argument.
M.S.R. Imports, Inc. v. R.E. Greenspan Co.,1 14 which also arose af-
ter the passage of the Copyright Act, is a paradigmatic section 602 (a)
case. Plaintiff engaged a Taiwanese manufacturer to produce certain
copyrighted miniatures of old-fashioned carts and wagons. The
Taiwanese manufacturer had no authority to change the articles in
any way or to distribute the wagon. Defendant purchased copies of
the wagons from Taiwanese intermediaries and imported them into
the United States.
The court eschewed a detailed discussion of section 602(a), ap-
parently because it felt that the effect of the section was obvious:
"The testimony in this case makes it clear that the Greenspan com-
pany did not manufacture the accused infringing works but, rather,
purchased them from an exporter in Taiwan. Nonetheless, a seller
and importer of an infringing work is liable for his acts of infringe-
ment."" 5 Evidently, the word "his" refers to the exporter/foreign
licensee. Thus, the court viewed section 602(a) as a substitute for an
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, Scorpio, 569 F.
Supp. at 47.
110 Id. at 49.
'11 Id.
112 Of course, courts still would have the power to disregard collusive or meaningless
sales, as when the importer owned the foreign intermediary that made the first purchase.
113 Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 49-50.
'"4 220 U.S.P.Q. 361 (1983).
115 Id. at 367 n.2.
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underlying wrong and held the importer responsible for the infringe-
ment or breach of contract by the foreign exporter.
In M.S.R. Imports the manufacturer had no distribution privilege.
The question remains whether the limitations, included in a license
that allows distribution within a limited area, accompany the articles
into the hands of successive purchasers. In a purely domestic situa-
tion the answer is that the purchaser is free of any contractual limita-
tions. The panelists in the Copyright Office discussion requested
section 602(a) only as a remedy against importation by purchasers of
products protected by American copyright manufactured abroad
who wrongfully export with impunity. Application of section 602(a)
to any other situation would elevate the provision to a complete ban
on trade in copyrighted works. Neither section 602(a) nor other
available evidence suggests that such a result is appropriate. The
copyright law does not protect copyright owners from domestic com-
petition in their works after sale and should not do so when the com-
petition comes from abroad.
Copyright owners are far from powerless even under this read-
ing of section 602(a). They can license foreign manufacture while
retaining distribution rights, thereby reaping the benefits of foreign
manufacture without exposing themselves to the danger of parallel
imports. In this situation, as M.S.R. Imports demonstrates, section
602(a), by any reading, protects the copyright owner. Also, copy-
right owners can exact higher royalties in exchange for the distribu-
tion license, and thus stifle competition from cheaper foreign
exports, or at least reap a greater reward for the expense that foreign
competition will generate. Once the copyright owner has taken ad-
vantage of the copyright monopoly, however, the rights secured by
the copyright laws, including the remedy of section 602(a), lapse
entirely.
VI. Conclusion
Review of the applicable and analogous law indicates that Con-
gress included section 602(a) in the United States copyright laws for
one fundamental reason: United States copyright owners were fac-
ing contractual problems overseas that were impossible or expensive
to remedy. Section 602 addresses this problem by severing foreign
licensees, according to their own agreements, from the United States
market. In this way, Congress eliminated the incentive to engage in
an unfair trade practice.
Accordingly, under this interpretation, which allows sections
109(a) and 602(a) to operate in harmony, a breach of the license
agreement is a necessary predicate to a section 602(a) violation. Ap-
plying this interpretation to the case presented at the outset of this
discussion, Y, the foreign manufacturer, has not breached its license
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agreement by the sale of records to Z, the distributor. Therefore, Z
may dispose of the records by a sale to T, the parallel importer.
Only if the initial sale from Y to Z violated the license would T's
subsequent importation of the records into the United States fall
within the scope of section 602(a) and outside the scope of section
109(a).
This interpretation leads to the same result whether one distrib-
utor or many stand between Y and T. A potential problem arises,
however, if Y sells to T directly with no intermediaries. Concep-
tually, the result should not be altered. First, the American copy-
right owner faces competition from parallel imports no matter how
many intermediaries purchase and resell the records. Second, the
place of purchase is still within Y's marketing area. Finally, a con-
trary result may violate the American antitrust laws.' 16 Yet, a legal
difference exists when a parallel importer purchases the goods di-
rectly, because if the purchase is deemed a breach of contract-a
breach of the license agreement between X, the copyright owner,
and Y, the foreign manufacturer-section 602(a) applies, and the im-
porter is an infringer. This breach-if it is a breach-is precisely the
circumstance addressed by section 602(a) because the American
copyright owner has no other available cause of action. It is unclear,
however, whether the purchase is a per se violation of the license
agreement. The license agreement would have to bar explicitly the
transaction for a violation to exist. This question requires thoughtful
consideration if the situation arises.
Clearly, parallel importers must proceed with caution. Nonethe-
less, in the usual case where no license has been breached, section
602(a) does not apply.
116 See A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE
1976 ACT 272 (5th ed. 1979).
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